勒索病毒样本分析
RE—SUN
RE—SUN
看雪学苑
2026年11月17日 18:06
上海
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真实病毒样本,结合沙箱、Process Monitor 和 x32dbg,重点分析了副本释放、持久化、文件感染及勒索窗口相关行为,并定位了宿主文件的核心解密循环,当前报告侧重行为链和关键代码验证,尚未覆盖所有执行分支。反调试的具体作用、各副本的协作条件、感染筛选与重复感染判断,以及不同感染文件的恢复适用性,仍需进一步分析。
1
沙箱与初步行为观察
1.1%20样本准备与分析平台
拿到的文件使用 .ex_ 扩展名。在隔离虚拟机中将扩展名改为 .exe,便于工具识别。更改扩展名不等于转换文件格式;文件是否为%20PE%20应通过 MZ、PE 签名和头部结构确认。本文使用微步沙盒辅助观察。
以下为笔记中列出的分析平台,未逐一验证其当前服务状态:
- 微步沙盒:https://s.threatbook.cn/
- 腾讯哈勃分析系统:https://habo.qq.com/
- 魔盾:https://www.maldun.com/analysis/
- 微点沙盒:https://sandbox.depthsec.com.cn/index.php/
- 奇安信文件深度分析平台:https://sandbox.ti.qianxin.com/sandbox/page
- ANYRUN:https://app.any.run/
- HybridAnalysis(Falcon%20Sandbox):https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/
- CAPE%20Sandbox:https://capesandbox.com/
- BD沙箱分析器:https://www.bitdefender.com/business/enterprise-products/sandbox-analyzer.html
1.2%20沙箱报告
1.3%20使用%20Process%20Monitor%20捕获运行行为
在隔离虚拟机中运行样本并使用%20Process%20Monitor%20采集,观察文件创建、进程启动及注册表操作。
运行记录中出现多个%20EXE%20副本和%20BAT%20脚本。挂起不同副本可辅助观察行为变化,通过对这些程序的挂起可以确定,后续的恶意行为(感染)主要由这些实例执行,而主线程主要用来解密产生这些文件的。
本次与.PML文件%20对照,大量文件替换由 BgcEwAcE.exe 执行;bAsMcgoE.exe 明确出现自启动、伴随文件映射和周期性属性检查。其他调试批次的职责应分别确认,不能仅凭文件名套用。
比如说,这里搜索的创建进程
可以看到可疑副本及%20BAT%20相关启动记录。这里“释放/生成文件”不一定等于解压;需结合文件写入、命令行和进程启动结果区分。
出现了伪装执法机构的勒索界面。界面自称使用“4096-bit%20key”,这是攻击者的界面宣称,不能作为实际加密算法的证明。
1.4%20沙箱信息提供
沙箱报告可提供后续动调的线索,但不能代替调用参数、返回值和分支证据。
这说明很有可能存在反调试
这张本地截图实际显示的是“通过创建服务实现自启动”,支持服务持久化线索,不能作为自解密证据。自解密应另外提供代码/数据的前后变化及执行流证据。
在看这个样本的行为,我们这里主要看的是win10的,别的系统版本和win10的不同。
我们观察到图标生成与多类文件处理。PML%20涉及%20EXE、JPG、PNG%20和%20P12%20等目标;
用了这么多api看一下他的导入表
导入表较少或动态调用较多,可能涉及运行时%20API%20解析;仅凭导入表和节权限,不能直接判定使用某种壳。
看到这里就差不多了,进入x32dbg吧。
2
x32dbg:主样本、宿主解密与伪装逻辑
2.1%20确定壳与入口与控制流观察
分析病毒是否加壳:
信息熵7.9,.text段高度混淆,被启发式识别,显然加壳。
入口附近存在大量跳转。可从明确的运行行为定位相关%20API,再回到样本侧分析调用链;大量%20JMP%20可以推测是某种壳或保护。
2.2%20确定反调试线索
IsDebuggerPresent
存在,进行反反调试,使用相应的插件试试,ScyllaHide插件是一个很好的选择
2.3%20根据内存和文件行为设置观察点
通常来说:解密后的代码需要一个安身之所,通常是一个具有可执行权限的新内存区域VirtualAlloc
代码段(.text)通常是只读的。要往里面写入解密后的代码,必须先获得“写”权限VirtualProtect
ReadProcessMemory / WriteProcessMemory:这对%20API%20常用于跨进程操作,要是不是跨进程的就是WriteFile
CreateThread创建一个新线程来执行解密后的代码
创建一个新的进程来运行病毒
可将下列接口作为候选观察点:
搜索有没有相应的api
- 存在
VirtualProtect,并下断点
%20%20但是这个具体的效果不大 - 存在
VirtualAlloc,下断 - 存在
WriteFile,下断 - 观察
CreateThread。 - 观察
CreateProcessA/W。
2.4%20内存分配与落盘观察
命中 VirtualProtect ,可以看他的参数,检查目标地址、区域大小、原权限、新权限及返回值。返回成功才能确认该次权限修改生效。
根据VirtualAlloc可知,进行了命中了39次,根据传参可知申请空间大小。
根据WriteFile,他要往里面写入解密信息,我们并不确定是不是一次性全部写入目标地址,但是如果是一次就写入的可运行文件,他会直接调用CreateProcess,多次写入,他就会多次调用WriteFile,最后才使用CreateProcess,但是如果是加密文件,他不一定会调用CreateProcess,但是他一定会使用WriteFile。
2.5 WriteFile 参数与%20PE%20缓冲区
下表仅适用于 32%20位 WriteFile API%20入口、尚未执行函数序言时 的栈布局;
第一次命中,
可以发现堆栈
跟进写入数据的缓冲区,发现:
展开:048E0000%20缓冲区原始转储(保留完整记录)
048E00004D 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 FF%20FF 00 00 %20MZ..........ÿÿ..
048E0010 %20B8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20¸.......@.......
048E002000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E003000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 B8 00 00 00 %20............¸...
048E00400E 1F%20BA 0E 00 B4 09 CD 21 B8 01 4C%20CD 21 54 68 %20..º..´.Í!¸.LÍ!Th
048E005069 73 20 70 72 6F 67 72 61 6D 20 63 61 6E 6E 6F%20 is%20program%20canno
048E006074 20 62 65 20 72 75 6E 20 69 6E 20 44 4F 53 20 %20t%20be%20run%20in%20DOS
048E00706D 6F 64 65 2E 0D 0D 0A 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20mode....$.......
048E008065 0D%20A3 87 21 6C%20CD%20D4 21 6C%20CD%20D4 21 6C%20CD%20D4%20 e.£.!lÍÔ!lÍÔ!lÍÔ
048E0090 %20AF 73 DE%20D4 2B 6C%20CD%20D4 21 6C%20CD%20D4 20 6C%20CD%20D4%20 ¯sÞÔ+lÍÔ!lÍÔ%20lÍÔ
048E00A052 69 63 68 21 6C%20CD%20D4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20Rich!lÍÔ........
048E00B000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 45 00 00 4C 01 03 00 %20........PE..L...
048E00C0 %20F8 2D%20AB 54 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 E0 00 0F 01 %20ø-«T........à...
048E00D00B 01 05 0C 00 BA 06 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20.....º..........
048E00E000 10 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 D0 06 00 00 00 40 00 %20.........Ð....@.
048E00F000 10 00 00 00 02 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E010004 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 F0 06 00 00 06 00 00 %20.........ð......
048E011000 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 10 00 00 %20................
048E012000 00 10 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 %20................
048E013000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 D0 06 00 50 00 00 00 %20........%20Ð..P...
048E014000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E015000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E016000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E017000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E018000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E019000 D0 06 00 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20.Ð..%20...........
048E01A000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E01B02E 74 65 78 74 00 00 00 00 C0 06 00 00 10 00 00 %20.text....À......
048E01C000 BA 06 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20.º..............
048E01D000 00 00 00 20 00 00 60 2E 72 64 61 74 61 00 00 %20....%20..`.rdata..
048E01E000 10 00 00 00 D0 06 00 00 02 00 00 00 C0 06 00 %20.....Ð.......À..
048E01F000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 40 %20............@..@
048E02002E 64 61 74 61 00 00 00 74 01 00 00 00 E0 06 00 %20.data...t....à..
048E021000 02 00 00 00 C2 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20.....Â..........
048E022000 00 00 00 40 00 00 C0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20....@..À........
048E023000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E024000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E025000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E026000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E027000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E028000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E029000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E02A000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E02B000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E02C000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E02D000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E02E000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E02F000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E030000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E031000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E032000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E033000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E034000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E035000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E036000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E037000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E038000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E039000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E03A000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E03B000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E03C000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E03D000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E03E000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E03F000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E04006A 00 68 05 30 40 00 68 00 30 40 00 6A 00 E8 17 %[email protected]@.j.è.
048E041004 00 00 6A 00 E8 16 04 00 00 E8 17 04 00 00 E8%20 ...j.è....è....è
048E04201E 04 00 00 E8 13 04 00 00 C3 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20....è....Ã......
048E043000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E044000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E045000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E046000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E047000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E048000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E049000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E04A000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E04B000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E04C000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E04D000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E04E000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E04F000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E050000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E051000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E052000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E053000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E054000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E055000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E056000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E057000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E058000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E059000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E05A000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E05B000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E05C000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E05D000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E05E000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
048E05F000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 %20................
该缓冲区以 MZ 开头,并包含 PE\\0\\0 和节表,可判断正在输出%20PE%20相关内容。0x600 是本次请求写入长度,不是整个%20PE%20的长度,也不能仅凭它判断整个文件已解密。对缓冲区设置写入观察点可追查数据来源,但命中位置可能是解密,也可能只是复制或%20PE%20头构造。
再次按%20F9%20运行至 CreateProcess,笔记记录命中%204%20次。这只能说明观察到了%204%20次进程创建调用;需要按返回地址、参数和返回值去重,不能推出存在%204%20次分段解密。
并且保存位置
为观察新建子样本,可在 CreateProcessA/W 入口检查第六个参数 dwCreationFlags,保留已有标志并按位%20OR 0x4(CREATE_SUSPENDED)。这使新进程的主线程初始挂起,不是取消进程创建,也不会暂停当前进程或其他已运行副本。其他%20CreateProcess%20变体的参数位置不同,不可照搬。应另外记录输出文件是否完整落盘及哈希,不能仅凭挂起判定成功脱壳。
2.6%20主样本继续生成副本和释放宿主
暂不进入子样本,继续观察下一次 CreateProcess 的参数与对应生成文件。是否为另一个病毒子样本。
再次运行,直到下次CreateProcess,发现一个文件sample,这里就要想了,为什么会生成这个文件。
这里我直接在CreateFile下断,一步步跟,最终发现了病毒创建文件的地方。
在WriteFile处下断点
这里可以看到42%204D------BM,通过查找发现是.bmp的标志头。
接下来就是要还原解密出被感染文件了,我们要找出它的解密逻辑,先看他要在哪里写。
WriteFile 的第一个参数是目标对象句柄 hFile,第二个参数 lpBuffer 才是要观察的源缓冲区地址;具体文件写入偏移由文件指针或 OVERLAPPED 等决定。
2: [esp+8] 00469452 sample.00469452 \"BM妇\"
2.7 定位 BMP 缓冲区与记录指令流
对本次 lpBuffer = 00469452 设置硬件写入断点,并且重新运行可以直接抓到解密后开始往里面写的位置,我试着运行一下,但是我发现他并没有往里面写入解密的信息,说明有可能他是在后面直接进行解密的,多次尝试F9,直到写入的内存位置是感染文件的标志,最后在第一次下段的地方直接用步进直到条件满足,这里罗列一下我的条件。
以下保留当时使用的条件。它适合截取循环片段,不能当作已经记录完整解密过程的证明:
- 暂停条件:
cip == 0x00401815。
04BEFF 047A0000 L\"C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\siMUkQEc\"
04BEFF 00000006
04BEFF 04770000 L\"C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\siMUkQEc\\\\OeskIQIQ.exe\"
04BEFF 00000006
04E6F4 07320000 L\"C:\\\\$Recycle.Bin\\\\S-1-5-21-2007155649-3056361496-518139155-500\\\\$I0GJIPS.exe\"
04E6F4 00000020
0560F444 04E60000 L\"C:\\\\ProgramData\\\\AQIgwIcg\\\\BgcEwAcE.exe\"
0560F448 00000080 ------------------------------------------------这一步是获取子样本属性后的一步,属性变成了普通状态
0584F6B8 04D50000 L\"D:\\\\Everything\\\\Everything.exe\"
0584F6BC 00000080
0584F6B8 04D50000 L\"D:\\\\Everything\\\\Everything.exe\"
0584F6BC 00000020
055CEA74 04D50000 L\"D:\\\\FlClash\\\\data\\\\flutter_assets\\\\assets\\\\images\\\\avatar\\\\arue.jpg\"
055CEA78 00000080
055CEA74 04D50000 L\"D:\\\\FlClash\\\\data\\\\flutter_assets\\\\assets\\\\images\\\\avatar\\\\arue.jpg\"
055CEA78 00000020
051EF444 04D50000 L\"D:\\\\IDA_Pro_9.2\\\\dbgsrv\\\\win32_remote32.exe\"
051EF448 00000080
051EF444 04D50000 L\"D:\\\\IDA_Pro_9.2\\\\dbgsrv\\\\win32_remote32.exe\"
051EF448 00000020
以上保留当时手工抓取的顺序。原始记录中的“清除属性”“尝试打开进程”等注释含有推断:GetFileAttributesW 只查询文件属性,不会清除属性或打开进程。SetFileAttributesW 参数 0x6 表示隐藏+系统,0x20 表示归档,0x80 表示普通属性;设置是否成功还需看返回值。文件属性不表示进程是否运行、被挂起或具有 SYSTEM 身份。
从文件访问顺序相似,不能直接推出两个副本的线程、职责或配置完全相同。
4.2 勒索窗口创建与显示
CreateWindowExA:
HWND hWnd = CreateWindowExA(
0, // 扩展窗口样式
\"JekMcsYw\", // 窗口类名
\"CscEcsc\", // 窗口标题
WS_POPUP, // 弹出式窗口
0, // X
0, // Y
1414, // 宽度
890, // 高度
NULL, // 父窗口
NULL, // 菜单
(HINSTANCE)0x400000,// 实例句柄
NULL // 附加参数
);
ShowWindow:
BOOL ShowWindow(
HWND hWnd,
int nCmdShow
);
多次调试中:允许一次伴随进程创建后,也就是子样本,继续运行至 UpdateWindow 附近,观察到勒索界面出现。这是时间上的先后关系,尚不能证明伴随进程是显示窗口的必要条件。
CreateWindowExA 负责创建窗口;ShowWindow 请求显示;UpdateWindow 在更新区域非空时直接触发 WM_PAINT。因此画面在 UpdateWindow 后显现,可能是窗口内容此时才绘制,并不说明该函数本身完成“锁屏”。需要记录 HWND → 所属 PID/TID → 窗口过程,并检查置顶、尺寸和输入控制机制。
以下保留当时的断点截图。后续应按 PID/TID 和样本侧调用返回地址关联。
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